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Human rights define the most fundamental responsibilities of those who hold 
power. In the cases of the Holocaust, or of the Rwandan massacres, we do not 
need a theory to tell us who was responsible for the violations of human rights. 
The violators were those who authorized and carried out the atrocities, who 
failed so conspicuously in their duties toward the humans that became their 
victims.  
The subject of this volume presents a more difficult question: Who, if 
anyone, is morally responsible for acting to alleviate severe poverty? Here our 
convictions are less steady. Are impoverished people responsible for improving 
their own condition? Or are the leaders of their countries also responsible, or 
the leaders of rich countries, or we ourselves as individuals? When considering 
this question we tend to have the kinds of reactions—avoidance of the topic, 
brief enthusiasm, nagging guilt—that indicate that we perceive several strong 
pulls on our reasoning, but are unsure how to order our thoughts so as to reach 
a firm conclusion. Here is where a philosophical account of responsibility 
might help. What we want to know is how to determine who, if anyone, has 
moral responsibility for ensuring that each person’s human right to an adequate 
standard of living is secured. What we seek is a general theory that will tell us 
how to locate responsibility for averting this type of threat to individuals’ basic 
well-being.  
White Rose Consortium ePrints Repository : http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/1620/
 2
In developing such a theory I will start not with contested questions 
about human rights, but with familiar cases in which we are certain where to 
locate responsibility for averting threats. There are after all many threats to our 
well-being in everyday life. In everyday life we face threats from traffic 
accidents, house fires, knives, guns, and toxic household chemicals. For each of 
these threats we are confident that we know who is responsible for making sure 
that the threat does not harm us. Moreover, we are surrounded by very young, 
very old, and very sick people who would not live long if they had to take care 
of their basic needs themselves. And again, we are certain that we know how to 
locate responsibility for taking care of these people who cannot take care of 
themselves. In these familiar cases we know without thinking who must take 
responsibility for averting threats to basic well-being. If we can find a theory 
that explains how we go about assigning responsibility in these familiar cases, 
we will have a theory of responsibility to draw on when ordering our reflections 
about who is responsible for responding to severe poverty. 
When we reflect on how we assign responsibility in everyday cases, I 
believe we find that a single principle is guiding our reasoning in almost every 
instance. We appear to rely on this principle to locate responsibility in a wide 
range of situations in which there are threats to basic well-being. It is striking to 
discover that a single principle can explain so much of our thinking about 
responsibility. Yet the main benefit of finding this principle is not theoretical; it 
is practical. The main benefit comes from a better understanding of where we 
should place responsibility for securing each human’s right to an adequate 
standard of living. 
1. Responsibility in Everyday Cases 
If you are responsible for something, then in the sense we are interested 
in it is up to you to take care of it. If you do take care of it, you have discharged 
your responsibility. If you do not, you may be subject to blame or punishment. 
When we blame or punish someone we do so because he has done something 
that he was responsible for not doing, or because he has not done something 
that he was responsible for doing. Yet how do we know where we should locate 
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responsibility for any particular task? How do we determine, that is, who 
should see to what? Since we are ultimately interested in severe poverty, we 
can ask a more focused question: How do we determine who should be 
responsible for preventing a serious threat from damaging the basic well-being 
of some particular person? 
Let us begin with an ordinary example of legal responsibility: the legal 
responsibility for averting automobile accidents. Two cars are traveling down 
the expressway in the same lane, one in back and one in front. Whose 
responsibility is it to keep the two cars from colliding? Who is it ‘up to’ to 
prevent this kind of accident? The obvious answer is that it is the responsibility 
of the driver of the car in back, not the driver of the car in front, to keep the two 
cars from colliding. If there is a collision, the driver of the car in back will be 
cited, and his insurance company will be the one who pays for damages. Yet the 
ease with which we answer the question of responsibility in this ordinary case 
does not mean that the answer explains itself. Why after all should we locate 
responsibility in the trailing driver, instead of in the lead driver—or perhaps in 
someone else entirely? 
The thought that it is the trailing driver who will have caused the 
accident will not help us here, at least if we stick to a philosopher’s definition 
of ‘cause.’ To a philosopher, the causes of an event are, roughly, all of the 
factors that contribute to the event occurring. In this philosopher’s sense, there 
is no way to pick out the actions of the trailing driver as especially significant. 
In a particular case, perhaps the accident would not have happened if the 
trailing driver had not edged so close to the car in front of him. Yet it may also 
be the case that the accident would not have happened had the lead driver not 
slammed on his brakes. In fact, if we seek out everything that contributed to 
this accident occurring, we will quickly collect a huge number of causal factors. 
It could be that the accident would not have occurred if the baby in the car in 
back had not been crying, or if a rabbit had not jumped out onto the expressway 
in the path of the car in front, or if the trailing driver had not gotten the last-
minute phone call that made him late for his appointment. When we say that the 
driver of the car in back ‘caused’ the accident, we are not intending this 
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philosophical sense of causation. We are scanning a large number of causal 
factors and picking out the actions of the trailing driver as where responsibility 
for the accident lies. The question is why we pick out this factor—the actions of 
the trailing driver—and say that this is the ‘cause’ of the accident in the sense 
that we use to assign legal responsibility.  
When we reflect on why we hold the trailing driver responsible for an 
accident in a case like this, we will arrive at the following explanation: the 
trailing driver is the person who can most easily keep the collision from 
occurring. It would be senseless, we think, to assign responsibility to the driver 
of the car in front—because it is much harder for drivers in front to avoid 
accidents with cars behind them. The kinds of things that lead drivers would 
have to do to avoid such accidents—constantly checking their rear-view mirror, 
suddenly speeding up or changing lanes—would greatly increase their risks of 
getting into accidents with other cars. It is much easier, we think, for trailing 
drivers to ensure that they keep their distance from the cars that are, after all, 
right in front of them. This is why we assign responsibility for avoiding these 
accidents to trailing drivers. 
The hypothesis here is that we place responsibility for preventing traffic 
accidents on the party who could most easily prevent the accident. This 
hypothesis seems fruitful: it appears to explain many ‘rules of the road’ for 
cars, and for vehicles besides cars as well. International maritime codes, for 
example, specify that more manoeuvrable vessels must keep out of the way of 
less manoeuvrable vessels. The captains of more manoeuvrable vessels, such as 
power-driven boats, are responsible for avoiding less manoeuvrable vessels, 
such as sailing ships, and ships engaged in fishing, and vessels not under 
command.1 It is easier for power-boats to avoid hitting sailing ships than vice-
versa. Aviation codes are based on the same principle. The right of way of the 
sky ranks craft in order of the ease with which they can be controlled. Airplanes 
in normal operation, which are the most easily manoeuvred aircraft, have the 
lowest priority in right of way. Airplanes refueling other aircraft, which are less 
easily manoeuvred, have a greater right of way than airplanes in normal 
operation. Balloons, which are still less manoeuvrable than airplanes refueling 
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other aircraft, have a higher priority right of way. Finally, aircraft in distress 
have the highest priority right of way of all—which makes sense by our 
principle, since what it is for an aircraft to be in distress is for it to be very 
difficult or impossible to control.2   
The general hypothesis is that responsibility for averting threats to basic 
well-being should be located in the agent who can most easily avert the threat. 
This hypothesis, when tested more broadly, appears to organize many of our 
thoughts about responsibility. The world is after all full of potential threats. It 
appears that we think that the fairest and most efficient way to allocate 
responsibility for these potential threats is to put the burden on the agent who 
can most easily bear that burden.  
Consider the threat of guns. We could say that it is the responsibility of 
each person to avert gun deaths by always wearing a bullet-proof body suit. Yet 
this would be burdensome, to say the least. We instead assign responsibility for 
averting gun deaths to the people who are holding the guns in their hands. 
These after all are the agents who can most easily avert the potential threats of 
death that are posed by the guns that they are holding. It is easier to avoid 
shooting someone than to avoid being shot. 
The idea that responsibility for averting serious harm should be located 
in the agent who can most easily avert the harm also explains one of our firmest 
and most general convictions about the location of responsibility. This is the 
conviction that, in a wide range of cases, competent adults should be 
responsible for taking care of themselves. If a competent adult edges too close 
to a cliff edge in broad daylight, or falls asleep while smoking in bed, or leaves 
the drain-cleaning fluid where he normally puts his mouthwash, we will say 
that he had no one to blame but himself for the harms that result. We could 
assign responsibility for averting these kinds of harms to other agencies, but we 
do not. Each competent adult is responsible for avoiding a great many threats to 
his own well-being because he is the agent who can do so at the least cost. 
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There are of course exceptions to the general rules about responsibility 
that we have just been discussing. Yet even these exceptions appear to follow 
the ‘least-cost’ principle. A driver is in most cases responsible for keeping his 
car off of the sidewalk, because in general the driver is the person who can 
most easily control the car. However, the driver is not blamed if his passenger 
suddenly lunges over and wrenches the wheel toward the pedestrians. This is 
because it is easier for the passenger to keep himself from wrenching the wheel 
toward the pedestrians than it is for the driver to stop the passenger from doing 
so. These kinds of exceptions to our general judgments about who is 
responsible for controlling threats are in fact not exceptions to our principle. 
They are themselves responsive to our judgments about who is most easily able 
to control a threat in the circumstances. 
2. Excessive Burdens 
Our ultimate aim will be to apply this hypothesis concerning the location 
of responsibility to the case of severe poverty. While we are not ready to 
address severe poverty at this early stage, we can see the general principle at 
work when we study our reactions to Peter Singer’s famous example of saving 
the drowning child (Singer 1972: 229-43). In Singer’s example, you notice a 
child drowning in a shallow pond nearby, and realize that you could save the 
child by wading into the pond and grabbing him. You have, we think, a 
responsibility to wade in and keep the child from drowning. You can, after all, 
save the child’s life, and you need only get your trousers muddy to do so. 
Saving the child is your responsibility. 
Why is saving the child up to you? You have the responsibility to save 
the child from drowning because you are the person who can most easily keep 
the child from drowning. Here, as before, the least-cost hypothesis explains our 
reasoning.  
Yet our reactions become less settled when Singer attempts to make a 
parallel between the pond case and our responsibilities toward people starving 
in Bangladesh (Singer was writing in 1971). When Singer makes us feel that 
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helping starving Bangladeshis is just as easy as saving the drowning child, we 
are drawn to the idea that we do have a responsibility to avert the threat of 
starvation that is endangering those Bangladeshis.3  While Singer has us 
believing that we can very easily save people from starving, we are pulled 
toward believing that we must do so. Yet in the back of our minds, or perhaps 
in the front, is a concern that perhaps we are not the people who can most easily 
avert the threat of starvation. Perhaps primary responsibility for alleviating the 
famine does not lie with us. Perhaps there are people closer by who should help 
instead, or perhaps there are people around us for whom the sacrifice required 
to help the Bangladeshis would be less costly than it would be for us. The 
thought that we may not have primary responsibility for responding to poverty 
in Bangladesh, and the question of whether we have some responsibility to 
these people nevertheless, are topics to which we will return.  
Reflecting on our reactions to Singer’s famine example also reveals a 
new thought, and an important qualification to our central idea. Perhaps, we 
think, Singer is simply wrong about the costs of aid. Perhaps we are indeed the 
people who can most easily act to alleviate the famine. Yet perhaps it would 
very expensive for us to do anything that could help. If the costs are very high, 
it might seem simply unfair to burden us with the responsibility for alleviating 
the famine, even if we are the people who could most easily do so. 
Responsibility, we appear to think, can be negated if costs are too high. If it 
would be too hard for the people who can most easily avert a threat to avert it, 
then we will not hold these people responsible.  
This is an important qualification to the central idea about assigning 
responsibility, and we can see it at work even in Singer’s case of the drowning 
child. You are responsible for saving the child if you are the person who can 
most easily do so—unless trying to save the child would put you at serious risk 
of drowning yourself. In a situation where attempting the rescue is itself very 
dangerous, we will not hold you responsible for making the attempt. Of course 
we have not said how much difficulty or danger will count as ‘excessive costs.’ 
Presumably, this depends on the magnitude of the threat in the circumstances at 
hand. Nevertheless, we are often very clear about what level of cost counts as 
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excessive. In the drowning child example, we are clear that you are not required 
to put your own life at risk in order to attempt the rescue. 
We can find this qualification for ‘excessive costs’ at work in all sorts of 
cases. Imagine you are spending the night in a remote cabin in the wilderness. 
A strange man, obviously dehydrated and seemingly delirious, appears at the 
fence. If the man calls for water, you might well believe that it is your 
responsibility to provide for him at least enough water to sustain him for the 
night. After all the man clearly needs water, you have a fair amount of water, 
and there is no one else around even if you had a telephone to call for help. Yet 
now imagine that you leave a bottle of water outside for the man, and he 
proceeds to pour it on the ground and call for more. Here you might think that 
your responsibility to help the man has run out. The thirsty man appears to take 
no interest in meeting his own basic needs, and leaving water out for him has 
not proved an effective way to help him do so. In this situation it might still be 
true that you are the person who can most easily ensure that the thirsty man gets 
rehydrated. But what you would have to do to secure his health—capturing 
him, restraining him, forcing him to swallow the water—would simply be too 
risky to expect you to do it. You have ‘done enough’ here, and may bear no 
further responsibility to assist the man, at least while he remains in his delirious 
state. 
These core ideas—about who can most easily avert threats, and about 
whether averting a threat would be too costly—form the backbone of our 
judgments about where (if anywhere) responsibility for averting threats should 
be located. The simple principle that lies behind our thinking about averting 
threats to basic well-being is that the agent who can most easily avert the threat 
has the responsibility for doing so—so long as doing so will not be excessively 
costly.4 In the next section, I distinguish two different ways in which this 
principle is elaborated in our reasoning about responsibility for averting threats 
to well-being.  
3. Role Responsibility 
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In the cases of the drowning child and the thirsty man we apply the 
principle of responsibility directly. There is a threat to the basic well-being of 
some individual A, and we assign responsibility to that individual B who can at 
that moment most easily act so as to avert this threat (so long as this is not too 
costly for B). In other cases, we apply the principle of responsibility not 
directly to individuals, but to individuals based on the general description that 
they fall under. For example, consider again the traffic case where one car is 
traveling behind another on the expressway. In our legal system, responsibility 
for preventing an accident always lies with the person falling under the 
description of ‘trailing driver.’ The trailing driver is always legally responsible 
for avoiding collisions with cars in front of him, even if in some specific, 
unusual case it would be easier for the lead driver to avert the accident. If there 
is a collision involving two cars where one was trailing the other, the 
authorities will not try to determine which driver could most easily have 
averted that particular accident. Rather, the authorities will always hold the 
person responsible who falls under a certain general description—‘trailing 
driver’—whatever the particular facts of the case at hand. In this kind of 
situation, we assign responsibility based on the general description, not based 
on the actual costs to individuals at a given moment. 
It is easy to see why we sometimes assign responsibility based on general 
descriptions. General descriptions help to define simple and public rules of who 
must take care of what. Having these simple and public rules makes it easier for 
people to coordinate their actions, and so reduces everyone’s risks. Driving at 
high speed on the expressway in the middle of a group of cars is potentially an 
extremely dangerous activity. The risks of driving on the expressway would be 
many times greater if each driver, at each moment, had to try to determine 
whether he or another driver was responsible for avoiding a collision between 
their two cars. Traffic rules such as ‘the trailing driver is responsible for 
avoiding collisions with the car in front of him,’ make it easy for each driver to 
know what he must do, and so reduce the risks of driving on the expressway to 
a tolerable level. 
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How then do we assign responsibility based on general descriptions 
when we create roles? The answer follows from the hypothesis that we have 
already framed. We assign responsibility according to the principle of ‘least 
cost,’ this time based on costs in the general case. For each type of situation 
where someone will predictably face a threat to basic well-being, we ask who in 
the general case will be most easily able to avert that threat (without being 
excessively burdened by doing so). In the expressway situation, we have 
determined that it is generally easier for trailing drivers to avoid accidents with 
lead drivers than vice versa. So we assign responsibility to trailing drivers. 
Similarly, we think that it is generally easier for airplanes in normal operation 
to stay out of the way of balloons than vice versa, so we assign responsibility to 
the operators of airplanes. And so on. 
The traffic-law cases are good examples of how we assign responsibility 
based on general descriptions. The least-cost principle can also explain 
assignments of responsibility that define some of our most important social 
roles. Consider, for example, the care of young children. We know that children 
will face any number of threats to their basic interests during their early years, 
from lack of adequate nutrition to accidental self-injury. Moreover, we know 
that young children will be incapable of avoiding many of these threats 
themselves. On whom, then, should responsibility fall to protect young children 
against the dangers they will predictably face? There are a variety of 
individuals and groups who could bear responsibility for children. Yet the most 
popular answer to this question, across many different societies, is that it is the 
biological parents of a child who should bear most of the responsibility for 
averting threats to the child.  
The ascription of responsibility to biological parents reflects an 
assessment of relative costs in the general case. Biological parents are assigned 
primary responsibility for taking care of their children’s basic needs because 
they are, in general, the people who will bear the least costs in carrying these 
responsibilities through. Biological parents, after all, often seek out the kind of 
relationship with the child where they are responsible for protecting the child’s 
interests. And even in cases where the biological parents have not sought out 
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this kind of relationship with the child, we tend to think that the parents will be 
less burdened by the responsibility than others would be, because humans have 
strong innate desires to protect their own offspring. Of course our rules for the 
care of children are more complex than simply ‘biological parents must assume 
responsibility,’ and later we will consider how some of these complexities can 
be explained. Yet on the first pass, reasoning about relative costs appears to be 
the basic explanation of why we turn the neutral general description ‘biological 
parent’ into the socially and legally responsible role of ‘parent.’  
The example of assigning responsibility to biological parents brings out 
another benefit of applying the least-cost principle to people as they fall under 
general descriptions, instead of case by case. Defining roles make it easier to 
know what one has to do both in order to take on, and in order to avoid, bearing 
a certain responsibility. This can be very useful for planning. For many people 
taking responsibility for the care of a child does not fit into their immediate (or 
even their ultimate) life plans. With roles constructed as we have them, people 
know exactly what they must do in order to avoid having responsibility for 
caring for a child. They must simply avoid coming under the description 
‘biological parent.’ Knowing what one must do in order to avoid burdensome 
responsibilities at any given time can be very helpful in arranging one’s 
activities so as to reach one’s goals.  
Of course not all social roles are avoidable. A nation under military 
attack will draft its young men to be soldiers—it will place primary 
responsibility for averting the most dangerous threats from the enemy onto 
those who fit the general description ‘able-bodied young male.’ These young 
males will typically have little choice in the matter. The least-cost principle 
explains why it is that young males are selected to fight: they are generally best 
suited to perform aggressive, physically demanding tasks; they are easier to fit 
into the bottom of rigid command hierarchies; and they are less likely than 
older males to have families and careers in progress. This example shows that 
we sometimes assign responsibility in such a way that it is unavoidable. It also 
shows, we might notice, that in cases of extreme threat we expect people to 
 12
bear very heavy burdens of responsibility. When there is a military invasion, 
the ‘get-out clause’ for excessive costs is very hard for young males to activate. 
We have been examining how we assign responsibility to agents falling 
under general descriptions, instead of assigning it case-by-case. As we broaden 
our perspective, it becomes clear that we deal with many serious threats by 
constructing not just single roles, but systems of roles. For instance, consider 
how we deal with the standing threat of house fires. A case-by-case assignment 
of responsibility for putting out house fires based on least cost would be 
burdensome to everyone. Imagine the disruptions and dangers in your life were 
you responsible for responding to fires whenever you were the person nearest 
to the fire. The role-based system of responsibility that we have set up is much 
more effective. In our system, we apply the least-cost principle to a series of 
roles, so that each group does what it can most easily do. Those who have 
income and wealth are responsible for paying taxes to fund the fire service. 
Those who work in city government are responsible for using these funds to 
train and equip firefighters. Firefighters are responsible for fighting the fires. 
The system of dividing responsibility among roles is effective in meeting the 
threat posed by house fires, the system of roles meeting this threat in such a 
way that each group of role-bearers faces a relatively low burden. 
In modern societies, almost all roles that we create to avert serious 
threats are parts of systems of roles. This is in fact true even of the roles of 
‘driver’ and ‘parent.’ Drivers have many responsibilities for averting accidents, 
but government officials also have responsibilities for maintaining and 
patrolling the roads so that accidents are prevented. Parents have immediate 
responsibility for feeding their babies, but officials have responsibility for 
running the economy in such a way that parents are able to procure food to feed 
their babies. When we examine these systems of roles, we will find the least-
cost principle always at work. In a good system, each role will be assigned to 
the group of people that can, because of the general description they fall under, 
bear the burdens of that role better than could other groups that might be 
singled out.  
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Of course, there is a certain amount of indeterminacy in the application 
of the least-cost principle. There are many roughly equivalent ways to set up 
traffic laws, child-care arrangements, and fire prevention schemes. Between any 
two possible systems of roles it may not be easy to tell which one imposes the 
least costs on its participants. What is crucial for all serious threats is that there 
be some system in place that meets the threat, and that this system is not 
obviously worse than some other feasible system would be. Serious threats to 
well-being must be averted, and it is the responsibility of the people who can 
avert the threats to settle on one system or another for responding to them. 
4. Primary and Secondary Responsibility 
We have examined the ways in which we assign responsibility for 
averting threats to basic well-being. We have found that we assign 
responsibility where it can most easily be borne, except when this would be 
excessively burdensome. With some ‘one-off’ threats, like children drowning in 
ponds, we apply the principle directly—whichever person is closest must help. 
When we face a more predictable type of threat, we set up a system of roles 
whereby people falling under certain descriptions are made responsible for 
what they can do at lower cost than others. The least-cost principle guides our 
reasoning about distributing responsibility, both immediately and 
systematically. 
What about when the person responsible fails? What if the person 
responsible for averting a threat does not, for one reason or another, do so? If 
we examine our judgments in these types of situations, we will find that the 
least-cost principle continues to work. If the person with primary responsibility 
is unwilling or unable to carry through on his responsibility, we assign the 
responsibility—‘secondary responsibility’—to the person besides him who can 
most easily bear the burden (so long as it would not burden this person 
excessively). If the person with this secondary responsibility then fails, we look 
for the person besides him who can next most easily shoulder the costs, and so 
on. We keep ‘stepping back’ levels to find bearers of responsibility, until (if 
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ever) we reach a level where fulfilling the responsibility would impose too 
great of a burden. 
We can see this ‘stepping back’ reasoning in action by modifying 
Singer’s child-in-the-pond example. While walking to work you see a child 
drowning in a shallow pond not far away. At the edge of the pond, between you 
and the child, a man sits on a park bench watching the drowning child with an 
impassive expression. This man is obviously not going to help, although being 
closer to the child it appears that he could do so more easily than could you. 
The distribution of responsibility here is still clear. The man on the bench has 
primary responsibility for wading in and grabbing the child. It is in the first 
instance up to him to perform the rescue. Yet since the man is not, apparently, 
going to lift a finger, the responsibility of rescue ‘steps back’ to you. Indeed 
your secondary responsibility here seems to be just as strong as if the impassive 
man were absent from the scene. 
We reason in the same ‘stepping back’ manner when assigning 
responsibility to roles. Biological parents have primary responsibility for 
averting threats to the basic well-being of their children. Yet what if the 
biological parents prove unwilling or unable to discharge their responsibilities? 
For instance, what if the parents die? What is the general description of the 
people who can now most easily look after the child? If there are guardians who 
have signaled their desire to take the child in these circumstances, the guardian 
will be assigned responsibility. Beyond this there are no hard and fast rules, but 
we know where to look. We will look for people who know the child, who are 
more likely to have some emotional attachment to him or her, who may have 
experience with raising children, and whose life plans are likely to be least 
disrupted. We are obviously looking for a family relation, and in our culture 
grandparents fit the bill. In other cultures, where extended families are bound 
more closely together, aunts, uncles and more distant relations might also be 
called on. Nor do we stop with family members to bear responsibility for 
children. If we do not find a family member willing or able to care for the child, 
we then step back one more level to vest responsibility for the child in the state. 
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Now it might appear that this explanation of how the least-cost principle 
bears on secondary responsibility has failed to register an important distinction. 
I have said that secondary responsibility vests whenever the primary 
responsibility-holder is ‘unwilling or unable’ to do what they ought. Yet it may 
seem to make a big difference whether the primary responsibility-holder is 
simply not willing to do what they should, or whether they are actually not 
capable of doing it. ‘Unwilling’ seems unlike ‘unable.’ This is correct—it can 
make a big difference to us whether the primary responsibility-holder is 
unwilling or, rather, unable. But the difference it makes concerns only the 
appropriateness of blaming or punishing the person with the responsibility. We 
blame and punish those unwilling to discharge their responsibilities; we excuse 
those who are unable. Yet the appropriateness of blame and punishment makes 
no difference to the assignment of secondary responsibility. Whether a primary 
responsibility-holder is blameworthy or not, or deserves punishment or not, we 
will still locate secondary responsibility in the person who can next most easily 
bear that responsibility. You are just as responsible for rescuing the drowning 
child whether the man on the park bench is callous, or whether he is rather 
disabled.  
The least-cost principle relocates responsibility whenever the holder of 
primary responsibility fails. It can also happen, of course, that this process 
works in reverse. Sometimes people become more capable of averting threats. 
Should the now-more-capable person become the person who can most easily 
avert the threat, then responsibility will shift to him. This ‘reverse’ shifting of 
responsibility can be seen in cases where a person regains responsibility for 
himself after a period of incapacity. The host of the party who gives the guest’s 
car keys back when the guest has finally sobered up is shifting responsibility 
for averting traffic accidents back onto the guest himself. We can also see this 
reverse process at work in our example of parenting. Initially the parents are 
primarily responsible for the main conditions and actions necessary to ensure, 
for example, that their child has adequate nutrition—for purchasing the food, 
preparing the food, cutting up the food, putting the food in the child’s mouth, 
and so on. As the child grows up, it becomes successively easier for him or her 
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to perform these tasks, and so the child takes over primary responsibility for 
performing them.5   
Indeed there are two basic strategies for fulfilling one’s responsibilities 
to avert a threat. The first is to avert the threat oneself; the second is to make it 
easier for someone else to avert the threat. The second strategy is in many cases 
preferable. For example, consider again the case of house fires. It would, as we 
have noticed, be very costly for each person to be obliged to respond to the 
fires that break out around him. It is far better to set up a system whereby a 
certain small group of persons deals with the immediate threat, while everyone 
in the larger group is responsible only for ensuring that the small group of 
persons has adequate resources to do their job. In setting up this system, the 
majority shifts responsibility for responding to house fires onto a small, 
specialized group. We use the same strategy when it comes to crime. It would 
be hard for each of us to police the area around us; so instead we shift many of 
these responsibilities onto a police force that deals with criminal activities. 
Individuals shift their responsibilities onto a smaller and better-trained group, 
and retain responsibilities only to pay taxes and to alert the police to crimes that 
they witness in the course of their normal activities. 
Of course, attempting to shift responsibility to another party is only 
defensible if one reasonably believes that this will be an effective strategy for 
averting the threat. One may not slip out of one’s responsibilities by shifting 
them to a party that one knows will never act to avert the threat, or by shifting 
them to a party that one knows will shift them right back. Once again, threats to 
basic well-being must be met, and the imperative in situations containing 
threats is that those responsible put in place some system that they believe will 
be effective in meeting those threats. 
5. The Nature of Our Responsibilities 
We have found the principle of least cost guiding our thinking about 
responsibility wherever we have looked. We can take a moment to reflect on 
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the nature of this principle before applying it finally to the case of severe 
poverty.  
On reflection, it appears that our reasoning about responsibility is in one 
way expansive, but is in the main rather conservative. Our reasoning is 
expansive in that it recognizes in principle no outer limit to the responsibility 
that one person may have for another. It is conceivable that—should all 
intermediate responsibility-holders fail—one individual could become 
responsible for the basic needs of another who lives very far away and whom 
he has never met. This potential expansiveness in our reasoning is what gives 
Singer’s examples their punch. You may be responsible for wading in to save a 
drowning child, even if you have never seen the child before. If you really are 
the person who could most easily keep a child from starving half-way around 
the world, then you may have the responsibility to do so even though the 
physical distance between you is great and your social connection is zero. 
Yet our reasoning about responsibility, though potentially expansive, is 
also conservative in two ways. First, we acknowledge a ‘get-out clause’ for 
excessive costs. We do not assign responsibilities to individuals or roles when 
it would be too costly to carry out such responsibilities. Passersby, for example, 
are not responsible for disarming knife-wielding psychopaths, however much 
these psychopaths are threatening themselves or others. A sister is not legally 
required to donate a lung, even when doing so is the only way to save her 
brother’s life. 
Second, our reasoning is conservative because it tends to press 
responsibility for sustaining an individual’s basic needs inward, toward the 
individual himself. This is the result of the general fact that individuals—and 
after them those physically and socially closest to those individuals—are often 
better able than others to take care of their own basic needs. Moreover, 
relatively ‘distant’ agents can frequently discharge their responsibilities by 
empowering those closer to the threat in a way that shifts responsibility toward 
them. 
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If we are looking for a capsule summary of what we have discovered 
about responsibility so far, we will find one in the adage: ‘With power comes 
responsibility, and with great power comes great responsibility.’ Any kind of 
agent who becomes more powerful also becomes more capable of averting 
threats, and thereby more responsible for making sure that those threats are 
defused. For example, as a child grows more capable, he becomes more 
responsible for taking care of himself. Similarly, a nation that builds up its 
military for self-defense becomes stronger, but it also becomes responsible for 
ensuring that its new troops and weapons do not harm (and even that they are 
available to rescue) the innocent. Citizens who build up institutions of 
government in order to provide themselves police protection may find that 
these institutions have become efficacious enough that they must now also be 
used to provide basic health and unemployment insurance to all. Even 
technology plays a role in locating responsibility, as it lowers costs and so 
increases power. The advent of mobile phones has made it easier for people to 
report serious crimes and accidents, and so has increased people’s 
responsibility to make these reports. You are, after all, more blameworthy for 
failing to report an accident that you see on the motorway if you have a phone 
in the car, than you are if the nearest phone is five miles behind you. 
We should notice also that our reasoning about where to locate 
responsibility is uncontaminated by distinctions between ‘positive’ and 
‘negative.’ Least-cost reasoning explains why trailing drivers are responsible 
for avoiding the cars in front of them, why adults are responsible for not tipping 
over cliffs, why parents are responsible for taking care of their children, why 
hosts are responsible for taking keys from (and can eventually return keys to) 
their intoxicated guests, why taxpayers are responsible for funding the fire 
service, and why owners of mobile phones are responsible for reporting 
accidents. Attempting to draw a line between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ 
responsibilities in these examples, even where this is possible, would be 
attempting to separate responsibilities with a single rationale. It may be that on 
particular occasions it would be easy for one person to keep from harming 
another, but excessively costly for that person to help the other. In this case the 
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first person would have a responsibility not to harm, but no responsibility to 
help—a ‘negative’ without a ‘positive’ responsibility. Yet this separation is not 
an exception to what we have discovered about responsibility. It is simply an 
application of the least-cost principle in a particular type of situation.6 
Indeed the striking fact about least-cost reasoning is that it appears to 
give a unified explanation of where to locate responsibility for averting threats 
to basic well-being. It appears to account for our assignments of responsibility 
wherever we look. If we do find cases that appear to be counter-examples, they 
will typically involve one of two kinds of mistakes. The first kind of mistake is 
to think that least-cost reasoning must always be applied directly, ignoring the 
fact that assigning responsibility to role-bearers is often a more effective long-
term solution. Why, for example, is Bill Gates not responsible for paying for 
the police and fire services that protect everyone in the country—or responsible 
for paying at least up to the point where he is no longer the richest man in the 
country? The last clause contains the answer to the question. An economic 
order in which the richest person was responsible for paying to avert threats to 
everyone up to the point where he is no longer the richest person would be a 
much less productive economic order than one with our system of progressive 
taxation. Such an order would be one in which the police and fire services 
would be worse at meeting the threats that they will predictably face. 
The second kind of mistake is to imagine that least-cost reasoning must 
be applied within roles. When we divide up responsibility for averting fire 
deaths, we assign the responsibility for fighting fires to a small professional 
group. Because of their training and willingness to take the job, this is the 
group that can fight fires at the least cost to themselves. Yet we do not of 
course think that whenever a fire alarm sounds it is always the most skilled, 
most energetic, and most enthusiastic firefighters that have the responsibility to 
respond. We would lose much of the efficiency that we gained by setting up a 
fire service if firemen had to determine for each call who within the group 
could most easily go. Moreover, always sending the most skilled and willing 
firemen to fight the fire might just be unfair. We assign responsibility to role-
bearers based on relative costs between groups; but using least-cost reasoning 
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to divide responsibility within a group would often be either counterproductive 
or simply wrong. 
6. The Principle of Compensation 
There is, however, one significant exception to our general reliance on 
least-cost reasoning. There are, that is, cases in which we assign responsibility 
for averting a basic threat to well-being to an agent who is not the agent that 
can most easily avert the threat. These are cases that fall under the principle of 
compensation. Compensation is required when one person has harmed another, 
and the harm to the victim constitutes a continuing threat to their basic well-
being. Say I cause a traffic accident that puts you in the hospital with failed 
kidneys. I may then have primary responsibility for paying for your long-term 
care, regardless of whether I am the person who can most easily do so. I am 
responsible for the care that averts the threat to your well-being because I 
caused the harm that now threatens your life. 
The principle of compensation is important in our reasoning, and we 
apply it beyond those situations in which basic well-being is threatened. I will 
be responsible for compensating you, for example, whether an accident I cause 
breaks your ribs or breaks only the front grill of your car.  
Yet the principle of compensation governs our reasoning in a rather 
restricted class of cases of threats to basic well-being. Moreover, even when the 
principle of compensation does apply, it is surrounded by least-cost reasoning 
on all sides. The principle of compensation is limited in at least five ways. 
First, the principle of compensation only applies when a threat to well-
being arises because there has been a harm. But most threats to well-being 
(from cars, weapons, poisons, cliff-edges) do not arise because one person has 
harmed another. In these cases, the idea of compensation can do no work in 
locating responsibility.  
Second, even when there has been a harm, it is least-cost reasoning that 
will determine who is responsible for having caused the harm in the morally or 
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legally relevant sense. Recall from our earlier discussion of drivers on the 
expressway that least-cost reasoning enables us to pick out the actions of 
trailing drivers as the ‘cause’ of certain accidents. We pick out the cause of 
harms by least-cost reasoning, and then hold the harm-causer responsible for 
the further threats to the victim’s well-being that have arisen from that harm 
(e.g., for the injuries from the accident). 
Third, the principle of least cost overrides the principle of compensation 
in emergency situations. Say that I fire an arrow far off into the distance, into 
the park, and when it comes down it goes through the shoulder of the person 
walking next to you. Who at this moment has primary responsibility for trying 
to stop the bleeding and getting the victim to the hospital? It is you, because 
you are closer to him than I am. I will be responsible for compensation only 
after the emergency is over.  
Fourth, the principle of compensation, even when we do apply it, is a 
shallow or one-leveled principle. Compensation can only locate primary 
responsibility. If the person who owes compensation is unwilling or unable to 
compensate, we will as always turn to least-cost reasoning to find the persons 
or groups who can most easily bear secondary responsibility for helping the 
victim.  
Finally, the principle of compensation becomes less important in our 
reasoning the less sure we are who is responsible for causing a harm, or indeed 
whether there has even been a harm at all. Attempting to apply the principle of 
compensation to this volume’s topic, severe poverty, would raise extremely 
complex questions. A variety of factors usually contribute to any given 
individual’s poverty, and it is often very difficult to judge what would have 
happened had some person acted differently or had particular institutions been 
differently structured. Moreover, it is likely that many of the people who have 
contributed to an individual’s poverty are no longer alive to do any 
compensating. Because of these complexities the principle of compensation 
appears to play little role in our thinking about responsibility for severe 
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poverty. We can therefore focus again on the least-cost principle, since it 
applies most fully to the case of severe poverty which is our central concern. 
7. Responsibility for Alleviating Severe Poverty 
There is one principle, we have found, that explains our beliefs about 
responsibility for averting threats to basic well-being in almost all cases. We 
rely on this principle when writing ‘the rules of the road,’ when assessing 
emergency situations, and when constructing our most basic social roles. 
Indeed with one limited type of exception, we apply this principle everywhere. 
The least-cost principle—with the qualification for excessive burdens, with the 
distinction between direct and role-based responsibility, and with the provision 
for stepping back to secondary responsibility—guides our reasoning about 
responsibility in almost all everyday examples of threats to basic well-being. 
We are now in a position to apply what we have discovered to the 
difficult question of alleviating severe poverty. Severe poverty is a major threat 
to basic well-being, and in our world poverty threatens the lives of billions of 
people. The question we face is who bears what responsibility for ensuring that 
this threat to these individuals is averted. 
Who, then, has primary responsibility for averting the threat of severe 
poverty? The answer, as we have seen, will depend on the circumstances. The 
least-cost principle says that, in good conditions, a great deal of this 
responsibility will rest with the individual himself (or, in the case of children, 
with the individual’s parents). When resources and opportunities are generally 
available, each person has primary responsibility for doing what he can to 
provide himself with adequate food, clothing, shelter, and so on. Each 
individual is responsible for taking care of his basic needs because, in good 
conditions, he is the person who can most easily do so.  
In many places, however, conditions are much less than good. 
Individuals are unable to secure for themselves an adequate standard of living, 
or can only do so with the greatest difficulty. In these kinds of situations, we 
should expect our reasoning to ‘step back’ to the next level, as in the everyday 
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cases above. If an individual becomes destitute and unable to provide for 
himself, then that individual’s family becomes responsible for his care. If a 
family becomes destitute and unable to provide for itself, then the local 
community becomes responsible for making sure the family has enough to live 
on. In each case here we are stepping back to find the agent who can bear 
responsibilities at least cost. 
What if a local community is unwilling or unable to take responsibility 
for averting the threats of severe poverty to some or all of its members? This is, 
unfortunately, all too common a state of affairs. Here we step back again to the 
level of the national government, and so arrive at the level of human rights. 
Human rights specify the responsibilities of those who hold power, especially 
state power. One responsibility of those control the state is to ensure that each 
resident of their territory is protected against the dire threat of severe poverty. 
This is the responsibility of securing each resident’s human right to an adequate 
standard of living.7 
So state officials are responsible for ensuring that every person in the 
territory can attain an adequate standard of living. When residents of a territory 
are faced with the threat of poverty, officials can take either of two courses of 
action for fulfilling their responsibilities. These two courses of action will be 
familiar from what we have already seen. First, officials can act to avert the 
threat directly. For example, if people are starving, officials can simply make 
more food (or the means for securing more food) available. Alternatively, 
officials can attempt to improve general economic conditions so that people are 
empowered to provide for their own needs. Officials taking this latter course 
might, for example, work to improve the country’s economy so that famines are 
alleviated and then prevented. Indeed, the two courses of action are not 
mutually exclusive. Officials can supply food to avert the immediate threat of 
starvation, while also working to improve the economy so as to avert the threat 
of famine in the longer term.  
The government of each state has a responsibility for ensuring that the 
conditions are in place so that the basic needs of each person in the territory can 
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be met. What if the government fails in its responsibility? Should a government 
be unwilling or unable to carry out its responsibilities, secondary responsibility 
then falls to the citizens of that country to install a new government capable of 
meeting the obligations of holding state power. The responsibility to reform a 
state wherein people cannot meet their basic needs rests in the first instance on 
the shoulders of the citizens of that country, because in general they are the 
people who can most easily make these reforms. 
Yet there are many cases in which the citizens of a state are unable to 
institute such reforms, or where it would be excessively costly for them to do 
so. In some countries it has proved extremely difficult for citizens to put into 
place a government that will meet its basic domestic responsibilities. In these 
circumstances, the responsibility for sustaining the conditions in which the 
basic needs of the citizens of this country can be met shifts again to the next 
level out. This is the level of foreign governments and the ‘international 
community.’  
The outward expansion of the assignment of responsibility that we have 
seen so far appears plausible, and there is no principled way to contain the 
momentum of the argument so that it applies only to co-nationals. The 
conclusion that states can have responsibility for securing citizens of other 
countries against severe poverty is the clear consequence of the principle of 
responsibility that has accounted for our firm beliefs in other cases. Some, 
however, have tried to keep the argument from extending this far. The 
government of the United States, for example, has never accepted that it might 
have responsibility for helping to ensure that the citizens of other countries 
maintain a decent standard of living. The severe poverty of foreigners, 
according to the U.S. government, generates not responsibilities, but at most 
aspirations.8   
Yet the U.S. and other countries cannot consistently refuse responsibility 
for acting to secure the rights of foreigners to an adequate standard of living. 
For the U.S. and other countries have long accepted that they can bear 
responsibility for averting threats to the basic interests of foreign nationals. 
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Consider, for example, the right to asylum. The right to asylum is by definition 
a right that obliges governments to protect foreign citizens when certain of the 
foreigners’ basic interests are being threatened by their own governments. All 
states, including the U.S., have acknowledged the right to asylum, and have 
acknowledged that this human right places them under corresponding duties. So 
the U.S. government, and all other governments, have already granted the 
principle that they can have responsibility for meeting threats to the basic well-
being of foreign citizens. Furthermore, the right to asylum itself follows from 
least-cost reasoning, since it is the government of the country of asylum that 
can most easily avert threat to the asylum-seeker’s life. 
Nor is it likely that the U.S. can succeed, as it has often tried to do, in 
making a fundamental distinction between ‘civil and political’ human rights 
and ‘economic and social’ human rights, or in its claim that the former are in 
some way more genuine than the latter. There have been many attacks on the 
coherence and significance of this distinction, and we can now see why these 
attacks have tended to be effective. Our reasoning about responsibility contains 
no fundamental rationale for making this distinction. The least-cost principle 
does not differentiate among types of threats, or among the actions that are 
required for averting these threats. The political/economic distinction has no 
more weight in our reasoning about locating responsibility than does the 
positive/negative distinction. In principle, these distinctions mean nothing. 
Moreover, the U.S. and others cannot plausibly resort to blaming the 
local government in order to avoid their responsibilities. In some poor 
countries, government officials may be simply unable to act to ensure that their 
citizens’ basic needs are adequately secured. In other countries, government 
officials may be ignoring the basic needs of their citizens and feathering their 
own nests. The corrupt officials in the second case are certainly reprehensible, 
and likely deserve blame and punishment for the suffering they are causing. Yet 
the distinction between unwilling and unable officials makes no difference to 
the argument about the responsibilities of the international community. As we 
have seen, whether a primary responsibility-holder is unwilling or unable to 
carry out their responsibilities can make a difference as to whether or not blame 
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or punishment are appropriate. But it has no bearing on the assignment of 
secondary responsibility. The assignment of secondary responsibility always 
goes to the agent or agents who can next most easily bear the costs of averting 
the threat in question. In this case, secondary responsibility lies with the 
international community—whether the local government is blameworthy or not. 
Of course, it may be that it is more costly for governments to help avert 
severe poverty in foreign countries than it is for governments to accept some 
asylum-seekers. We have found that considerations of cost do indeed play a 
basic role in our reasoning about responsibility, so there is some room for 
political leaders to allege that meeting the costs of averting severe poverty in 
our world would simply be excessively burdensome. One version of this 
allegation would be the claim that developed countries have tried 
conscientiously but unsuccessfully to alleviate severe poverty in poor countries, 
and that trying harder would be simply too costly. (Recall here the thirsty man 
who pours out the water). 
In general, these pleas of excessive costs are not compelling. There is 
almost certainly some international economic and political system that is now 
available to us in which no individual would face a high risk of severe poverty, 
and in which no party was burdened by excessive costs. There is, that is, some 
feasible system for averting severe poverty where no one is excessively 
burdened by the responsibility to secure the human right to an adequate 
standard of living. In fact, it is likely that the problem is less that there is no 
feasible and effective system for dividing responsibilities, than that there are 
too many possible systems.  
There are many ways of dividing up responsibility among the actors in 
the international community that could avert severe poverty. For example, one 
scheme might place more emphasis on regional political solutions, which 
would require governments to attend more closely to the governance of those 
countries in their vicinity. Another scheme might place more emphasis on 
global economic solutions, which would require, for example, more equitable 
tariff and subsidy levels between developed and developing countries. Another 
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scheme might require major development efforts to be funded by countries 
proportionately to the size of their national products. No doubt there are other 
kinds of schemes, and schemes that contain ‘mixed’ strategies. The costs of 
moving to any particular one of these schemes for dividing responsibility would 
not be excessive, but for each scheme the costs would be significant and would 
fall differently on different parties. Each government prefers the schemes that 
would be less costly for its own country. This is why we get the kind of finger-
pointing and delay on the issue of severe poverty that have become so familiar. 
The governments of rich countries will together continue to say that the 
governments of poor countries should bear more responsibility for fighting 
corruption. The U.S. and Europe will continue to advance proposals for 
reducing farm subsidies that each knows will be unacceptable to the other. 
Every country will favor a different scheme, knowing very well that the lack of 
coordination will mean that no satisfactory scheme will be put in place. 
There are, no doubt, many people who are to blame for this state of 
affairs, but as always allocating blame is not our main concern. What is 
important is that the threat of severe poverty, which harms so many, be averted. 
When someone is drowning, it is no good for the people nearby to begin an 
argument about who can most easily perform the rescue. The important thing is 
that something be done so that the person is saved. The leaders of the 
international community have a responsibility to ensure that some definite 
scheme be put in place that averts the threats of severe poverty for all. An 
adequate standard of living is the right of each person, and the international 
community bears the responsibility for ensuring that—in one way or other—
each person’s right be secured. Leaders may choose to act more directly—for 
example, by sending food aid to avert the famines that arise. Or they may, with 
greater likelihood of success, choose to revise the system of international 
political and economic institutions so that the threats of severe poverty do not 
arise in the first place. Or they can opt for some combination of these strategies. 
What is important is that they decide upon some system that will enable the 
international community to discharge its responsibility to avert the threat of 
severe poverty.  
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8. Individual Responsibility for Severe Poverty 
The location of secondary responsibility in the leaders of the 
international community returns us to the adage that with power comes 
responsibility, and with great power comes great responsibility. Responsibility 
falls on developed countries because these countries can help without bearing 
excessive costs. The costs to these nations are not excessive because these 
nations have been economically and politically successful. States which have 
been successful find themselves with the resources necessary to assist those 
states which have been unable to create (or have been prevented from creating) 
the conditions wherein they can provide for their own needs. The price of 
success is to ensure that others can also succeed. 
 Of course, the momentum of the argument does not stop here. We must 
admit to ourselves that our own political leaders have repeatedly proved 
themselves either unwilling or unable to discharge their responsibilities for 
averting the threat of severe poverty around the world. And there is still one 
level left to which we can step back. This is the level at which we act as 
individuals. We have seen that in principle there is nothing in our reasoning 
about responsibility that will keep one person from being responsible for 
averting threats to any other person, no matter how unrelated or far away. 
Singer’s arguments tried to draw on this fact to reach conclusions about our 
responsibilities, yet his arguments left out the intermediate steps. We have now 
traced responsibility back, step by step, until it rests again with us as 
individuals. This is a conclusion that we must accept if we are to remain true to 
our most basic principles about the assignment of responsibility. 
We are, then, as individuals responsible for doing what we believe will 
be effective in alleviating and preventing severe poverty. We are responsible 
for doing this up to the level where it would impose excessive costs for us to do 
more. As always, these responsibilities can be discharged either directly or by 
empowering those closer to the problem. We can act to alleviate severe poverty 
directly by giving our resources to organizations that we believe will be 
effective in helping those threatened by poverty. Or we can give our political 
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leaders incentives to carry through on their own responsibilities by making it 
clear that leaders who shirk their responsibilities will pay costs in political 
support. Or we can combine both strategies. What is important is that each of us 
actively assume the responsibilities we have for averting the dangers of severe 
poverty that threaten so many. We must carry out these responsibilities in order 
to live up to the principle of responsibility in which we already believe. If we 
do not abide by our own principles, we will not live up to our own convictions 
about what it is morally up to us to do. 
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